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Abstract
We analyze a model with two-dimensional asymmetric informa-
tion in which the employer has better information about the rms
earnings potential and the employee is subject to moral hazard. The
employees contract consists of an annual bonus and stock options. We
focus on two issues: how di¤erent degrees of asymmetric information
about short-term earnings versus long-term earnings a¤ect optimal
contracts and second, if a signalling equilibrium exists, what infor-
mation concerning the rms performance prole over time can be
conveyed by the choice of contract. We show that if the extent of
long-term (short-term) asymmetric information is larger, short-term
(long-term) compensation prevails. With regard to signalling, we show
that rms o¤ering more options have higher short-term performance
and lower long-term performance. This provides new insights into the
structure of earnings-based compensation.
JEL classication: D82, J33, M12, M52
I would like to thank Je¤rey Coles, Jonathan Cohn, Anand Goel, Thomas Lys and
2007 Financial Management Association Annual Meeting participants for useful comments.
I also appreciate the editing assistance of Peter Hu¤man and Conor Meade.
1
1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the structure of earnings-based compensation contracts
(long-term versus short-term) and is based on the existence of ex-ante asym-
metric information between an employer and a worker. The literature deal-
ing with asymmetric information related to the employer-worker relationship
usually assumes that private information is held by potential workers (such
as their ability level, for instance).1 In the present paper, an employer has
private information about a rms earnings potential.2 We argue that this
signicantly a¤ects the optimal structure of earnings-based compensation
contracts which have been used in an increasing number of contracts in re-
cent years and which remain puzzling from a moral hazard or agency theory
viewpoint.3 The following anecdotal evidence illustrates employersusage of
private information when designing the structure of compensation contracts.
General Dynamics and other defence rms (very successful at the time) in-
creased stock options when they began to receive information about the end
of defence spending linked to the end of Cold War (Dial and Murphy, 1995)
since cash bonuses became too costly.
We analyze a signaling game where private information is two-dimensional:
the employers have private information about short-term and long-term ex-
pected earnings.4 The degree of asymmetric information regarding short-
term and long-term earnings may vary. Asymmetry regarding long-term
earnings is high when information about short-term prospects is publicly
available while long-term performance is unknown. This may be the case
when short-term performance relies on past decisions which are publicly
observable while long-term performance may depend on strategic decisions
which are not disclosed. Long-term asymmetry may also be high when
1See, for example, Spence (1973), Salop and Salop (1976), Berkovitch (1986), and
Handy and Katz (1998).
2Lambert (2001) noticed that a set-up where the principal (employer) has private infor-
mation about strategic varibales is interesting for analyzing compensation related issues.
Existing literature on implicit contracts (pioneered by Azariadis, 1983) studies similar
situations. This literature analyzes the level of unemployment, the problem of wage rigid-
ity and other macroeconomic questions. The structure of compensation contracts is not
usually the focus.
3See, among others, Lambert (2001) and Yermack (1995, 1997).
4See Miglo (2007, 2008) and Miglo and Zenkevich (2006) for the e¤ect of long-term
private information concerning future earnings on capital structure.
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there is asymmetric information regarding the entrepreneurial skills of top-
management. Asymmetric information regarding short-term earnings is high
when the rm has important private short-term information like delays in
production, allowance for bad debts, recognition of sales not yet shipped,
estimation of pension liabilities, capitalization of leases and marketing ex-
penses, delay in maintenance expenditures while there is little asymmetry
regarding long-term information. This can also be the case when the quality
of accounting technology is low or when monitoring is very expensive.
If a separating equilibrium does not exist, equilibrium is pooling where
rms use the same compensation policy. We show that if the extent of long-
term asymmetric information is larger, short-term compensation prevails. If
short-term private information is more important, long-term compensation
prevails. Intuitively, rms will try to avoid adverse selection costs by using
contracts contingent on earnings with less uncertainty. This is consistent
with evidence provided by Bushman, Chen, Engel and Smith (2004). The
authors show that stock options are inversely related to the timeliness of
accounting numbers or to the extent to which current earnings incorporate
value-relevant information. If the asymmetry regarding current earnings is
high, the relationship between current earnings and rm value is low.
With regard to signalling, we show that a separating equilibrium does
not exist if the extent of asymmetric information regarding the magnitude
of total earnings is high. For instance, some rms may expect much higher
earnings than others in both the short and long term. In this case rms with
low expected earnings mimic the compensation policy of rms with relatively
high expected earnings mirroring the famous "lemon" adverse selection e¤ect
(Akerlo¤, 1970). However, if asymmetric information regarding the magni-
tude of total earnings is small while asymmetric information regarding the
temporal distribution of earnings is high a separating equilibrium may ex-
ist where rms with high short-term expected earnings may issue more op-
tions than rms with low short-term expected earnings. This equilibrium
also explains why short-term earnings-based compensation may prevail over
long-term compensation and why the use of stock options may be negatively
correlated with a rms future performance (contrary to the usual moral
hazard predictions). This phenomenon is puzzling from the standard moral
hazard point of view while it has been observed in practice (see, for instance,
Yermack (1997) and Cheng and Farber (2006)).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The basic model is described
in Section 2. Sections 3 and 4 analyze the optimal design of compensation
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contracts under asymmetric information. The model implications, empirical
evidence and suggestions of possible strategies for testing the results are
discussed in Section 4. The conclusion is presented in Section 5.
2 Model.
Consider a rm with a two-stage production process. In each stage t = 1; 2,
earnings ert depend on a workers e¤ort and the rms productivity. For
simplicity assume that there are two levels of e¤ort et. If et = 0 then ert = 0.
If et = 1, production can either be successful or unsuccessful. If the former
is the case, ert = 1 and if the latter is the case, ert = 0. There are two types
of rms. For type g ("good") the probability of success in the rst period
equals g1 and that in the second period equals g2. Type b ("bad") has
parameters b1 and b2. By denition, g has better overall performance than
b: vg > vb, where vx = x1 + x2 is rm xs total expected earnings over the
two periods. Let 0 be the proportion of type g rms, 0 < 0 < 1. Letbt = gt0 + bt(1  0) ("average rmsperformance in period t"). In each
period, et = 1 costs theWorker c. We assume that the s are restricted to the
interval (c; 1], which implies that et = 1 is socially optimal and production
is protable in each period. Stages are technologically dependant. If e1 = 0
then, regardless the e¤ort in the second period, r2 = 0.
At the beginning of each period the Employer (the rms owner or the
Directors Board) o¤ers a contract to the Worker. The Worker may accept or
reject the o¤er. If the o¤er is rejected then the payo¤ to both parties equals
0. If the o¤er is accepted then the Worker chooses e1. The same scenario
repeats in the second period after the parties observe r1. The Workers
payo¤ is a fraction of the rms prot. The rst-period contract contains
two numbers: an annual bonus representing a fraction (f1) of rst-period
earnings and a portfolio of stock options which give the Worker the right
to purchase a fraction (f) of the rms shares (it is assumed for simplicity
that the exercise price equals 0) at the end of the rst period.5 Selling
5The assumption concerning zero exercise prices is not crucial. Also, the introduction
of more kinds of compensation such as restricted stocks, long-term incentive plans or
retirement plans in the contract will not alter the results. Both these points hold true as
long as long-term compensation depends more on the rms second-period earnings than
on rst-period earnings. This is even the case for restricted stocks because they usually
have di¤erent timing constraints (Murphy, 1999).
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options at the beginning of the rst period is prohibited. Companies often
put restrictions of this nature on the sale of options at the beginning of
a workers employment. Typically, options are not directly tradeable and
secondly they become exercisable (i.e. the recipient is given the right to buy
stocks) over time (Murphy, 1999). The second-period contract contains only
the annual bonus of the Worker which is represented by a fraction of the
second-period prot (f2). We assume limited liability for both parties:
0  ft  1 and 0  f  1 (1)
f2 + f  1 (2)
If f1 < f the equity-based component (long-term incentive) prevails in the
rst-period contract and vice versa. Let t denote the proportion of earnings
retained by the Employer in period t. Clearly,
1 = 1  f1 and 2 = 1  f2   f (3)
There exists universal risk-neutrality in this economy. For simplicity it
is assumed that the Workers reservation payo¤ in each period equals 0.
The second-period incentive constraint for the Worker is that his expected
second-period payo¤ is not smaller than c. We also assume the existence of
a perfect capital market for shares. At the end of rst period the Worker
can sell a portion of their shares. We denote the remaining fraction of shares
by fn. In the rst period, the Workers incentive constraint (assuming that
the second-period incentive constraint holds) is that his expected net payo¤
from supplying e1 = 1 (which includes the rst-period bonus, the value of
shares sold at the end of the rst period, and the second-period payo¤minus
c) is not less than c.6 The Employer knows the rms type, but the Worker
does not. The distribution of types is common knowledge. The contracts are
enforceable at no cost.
The sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 1. We assume that the
rms type is revealed to the Employer in period 0. Throughout this arti-
cle, we use the concept of Perfect-Bayesian equilibria and also verify that
o¤-equilibrium beliefs survive standard renements such as Cho and Kreps
(1987) intuitive criterion and mispricing. The usage of these criteria in a
6The Worker is ready to exchange the cost of e¤ort for consumption in either the rst or
second period. This can be interpreted as a perfect credit market with a risk-free interest
rate equal to 0. This allows workers to transfer funds between periods.
5
game without repetition where the informed party moves rst is quite com-
mon in existing literature.7
-t = 0 t = 1 t = 2s s s
Firms type
is realized
It is revealed to
the Employer
Employer o¤ers f1 and f
to the Worker
If the o¤er is rejected
both parties get 0
Otherwise the Worker
chooses e1
Project yields r1
It is distributed to
the parties
The Worker decides how
many shares to sell
Employer o¤ers f2
to the Worker
If the o¤er is rejected
both parties get 0
Otherwise the Worker
chooses e1
Project yields r2
It is distributed
to the parties
Figure 1. The sequence of events.
2.1 Symmetric information.
This subsection provides some useful information about benchmark contracts
when the Worker knows the rms type. The relations describing the parties
decisions and payo¤s are:
1) the second-period incentive constraint for the Worker:
c  (fn + f2)2 (4)
If it holds then e2 = 1. Otherwise e2 = 0.
2) the choice of f2 by the Employer:
f2 = argmaxE[(1  f2   fn)r2] (5)
3) the rms market value at the end of the rst period equals V1 = 2 if
the capital market believes that the Worker will supply e2 = 1 (i.e. condition
(4) holds) and zero otherwise.
7See, for instance, Diamond (1991, 1993), Myers and Majluf (1984) or Nachman and
Noe (1994).
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4) the Workers decision to sell shares:
fn = argmax[(f   fn)V1 +maxf0; (fn + f2)2   cg] (6)
where (f   fn)V1 represents the value of shares sold by the Worker and
maxf0; (fn + f2)2   cg is the Workers expected second-period payo¤.
5) the rst-period incentive constraint for the Worker:
c  f11 + (f   fn)V1 +maxf0; (fn + f2)2   cg (7)
6) the Employers payo¤ is
 = 1r1 + 2r2
Given (3) we can write
 = (1  f1)r1 + (1  f2   f)r2 (8)
The Employers problem is to maximize the expected value of (8):
f1; f = argmaxE[(1  f1)r1 + (1  f2   f)r2] (9)
Proposition 1. When information is symmetric:
f2 = c=2 (10)
c = f11 + f2 (11)
V0 = E = 1 + 2   2c (12)
(all mathematical proofs are collected in the Appendix).
From (10), the fraction of second-period earnings o¤ered to the Worker,
is positively related to the cost of e¤ort and negatively related to the rms
expected performance in that period. The logic behind (11) is similar. Eq.
(12) implies that in the case of perfect information, the value of the rm (for
the Employer) does not depend on the structure of the compensation contract
(short-term versus long-term) o¤ered to the Worker as long as conditions (10)
and (11) hold. For instance one can have a contract with a very small f1 as
well as a contract with a very small f .
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3 Signalling by the choice of compensation
contract.
Now suppose that the rms type is the Employers private information. We
start with an e¢ cient separating equilibrium where each type of Employer
gets the rst-best return (12). From (10) and (11) the strategy of the Em-
ployer can be completely described by only one variable. Take f1 for conve-
nience. Let V f1km be the expected payo¤ to the Employer of type k if strategy
f1 is played and the type is perceived by the Worker as typem; k;m 2 fg; bg.
A separating equilibrium is a situation where type g plays strategy f1g, type
b plays strategy f1b and neither type has an incentive to mimic the other.
V f1bgb  V f1ggg (13)
V
f1g
bg  V f1bbb (14)
Given limited liability and that if the contract is rejected, the payo¤ to
the rm equals 0, only accepted contracts are a part of equilibrium. There-
fore, the value of V f1km depends on the performance of type k and the issued
contracts which in turn depend on the Workers beliefs about the rms type
(type m).
V f1km = (1  f1m)k1 + (1  f2m   fm)k2 (15)
where from (10) and (11):
fm =
c  f1mm1
m2
(16)
f2m = c=m2 (17)
We also know from Proposition 1 that V f1xxx = vx   2c; x 2 b; g.
Lemma 1. If gt  bt; t = 1; 2 an e¢ cient separating equilibrium does
not exist.
Intuitively, if the good type (g) has better performance in both periods
then any contract issued by this type has a higher value than that issued
by type b. Therefore the latter always mimics type g. Thus, a necessary
condition for the existence of an e¢ cient separating equilibrium is one of the
following. Either g1 > b1 and g2 < b2 or g2 > b2 and g1 < b1. We will
now continue with these two cases. The values of di¤erent contracts depend
in di¤erent ways on the rms expected performance in each period. Since
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each type performs di¤erently in each period the value of contracts o¤ered by
di¤erent types are di¤erent. To avoid mimicking, type g will o¤er contracts
which put more weight on the earnings in the period when it underperforms
type b. Thus, in the rst case, we expect that type g will o¤er a contract with
a large number of stock options while in the second case it will o¤er a large
bonus. In a separating equilibrium, type b will o¤er the opposite contracts.
The analysis of conditions (13) and (14) leads to the following result.
Proposition 2. If g1 > b1 and g2 < b2 then a separating equilibrium
exists if and only if
g1b2   b1g2
g1   b1  2c (18)
Furthermore if a separating equilibrium exists then
f1b  f1g
2) if g2 > b2 and g1 < b1 then a separating equilibrium exists if and only
if
b1
g1
+
b2
g2
 2 (19)
Furthermore if a separating equilibrium exists then
f1b  f1g
Proposition 2 implies that rms which have better performance in the
rst period and weaker performance in the second period will o¤er a lower
fraction of short-term bonuses to the Worker. Consider the interpretation
of conditions (18) and (19). Two ideas underline the analysis below. First,
when the di¤erence between rmstotal values is large enough a separating
equilibrium does not exist. This is because the type with a low total value will
mimic the high value type. A large di¤erence in the rmsrates of earnings
growth contributes to the existence of a separating equilibrium by making it
possible for g to design debt claims which will not be mimicked by b. To see
this let us rewrite (19) as follows:
vbvg(rb   rg)
vg(1 + rb)  vb(1 + rg)  2c (20)
vb(rg + rb)(1 + rg)
vgrg(1 + rb)
 2 (21)
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where rx = x2=x1 is the rate of earnings growth for type x. The condition
rx > 1means that a rm has an increasing earnings prole, rx < 1 and rx = 1
means that the rm has a decreasing or at earnings prole respectively.
Corollary 1. A separating equilibrium exists if and only if the following
holds: 1) the extent of asymmetric information regarding rmstotal values
is su¢ ciently small and; 2) the extent of asymmetric information regarding
rmsperformance proles over time is su¢ ciently large.
Figure 1 illustrates Corollary 1. Here rg = 1:5; vg = 1:6; g1 = 0:64; g2 =
0:96 and c = 0:4. The gure shows the values of rb and vb for which separating
equilibriums may exist. In the space between the thick lines (F2) a separating
equilibrium does not exist. In F1 and F3 a separating equilibrium exists.
Note that for any value of vb a separating equilibrium exists if rb di¤ers
su¢ ciently from rg and for any rb a separating equilibrium exists if vb is
high enough (close to vg). In other words, a separating equilibrium exists
if asymmetric information about rate of earnings growth is more important
than that concerning the rmstotal values.
-
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1 1:6
1:5
vb
5
rb
F1
F2
F3
(vg; rg)
Figure 1. Separating equilibria.
4 Pooling equilibria.
Let us turn to the analysis of pooling equilibria where both types play the
same strategies in both periods: f1; f; f2.8 The relations describing the par-
8Note that a separation in the second period cannot exist after pooling in the rst.
Indeed, suppose the opposite is true and in the second period one type o¤ers a lower
fraction of earnings to the Worker than the other type. If this o¤er is accepted, the
other type will obviously mimic this strategy. Otherwise this strategy cannot be a part of
equilibrium given the limited liability of the Employer.
10
tiesdecisions and payo¤s are:
1) the second-period incentive constraint for the Worker:
c  (fn + f2)(2g2 + (1  2)b2) (22)
where 2 is the Workers belief at the beginning of period 2 that the type is
g. According to Bayesrule:
2 =
g1
g1 + (1  )b1 if r1 = 1
2 =
(1  g1)
(1  g1) + (1  )(1  b1) if r1 = 0
2) the rms market value at the end of the rst period equals V1 =
2g2+(1 2)b2 if the capital market believes that the Worker will supply
e2 = 1 (i.e. condition (22) holds) and zero otherwise.
3) the Workers decision to sell shares:
fn = argmax[(f   fn)V1 +maxf0; (fn + f2)(2g2 + (1  2)b2   cg] (23)
where (f fn)V1 represents the value of shares sold andmaxf0; (fn+f2)(2g2+
(1  2)b2   cg is the Workers expected second-period payo¤.
4) the rst-period incentive constraint for the Worker:
c  f11 + E[(f   fn)V1 +maxf0; (fn + f2)(2g2 + (1  2)b2   cg] (24)
5) the payo¤ to the Employer of type x is
V = (1  f1)x1 + (1  f2   f)x2 (25)
Lemma 2. If a pooling equilibrium exists then
c = f1 b1 + f b2 (26)
f2  f2(r1) = c=e2(r1) (27)
where e2(r1) = 2g2 + (1  2)b2
Note that in contrast to the symmetric information case, f2 depends on
2 and r1 because the Worker updates his beliefs about the rms type after
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observing rst-period earnings. From (27) and (26) the equilibrium strategy
can be completely described by only one variable. Take f1 for convenience.
Let V f1x be the expected payo¤ to the Employer of type x in the case of
a pooling equilibrium with f1. A pooling equilibrium is a situation where
both types play strategy f1, o¤-equilibrium workers beliefs about observing
an o¤-equilibrium strategy f1off are that the rm is type g with probability
off (f1off ) and
V f1x  V f1offx ; x 2 b; g (28)
We have:
V f1g = g1(1  f1 + (1  f2(1)  f)g2) + (1  g1)(1  f2(0)  f)g2 (29)
where f2(r1) is given by (27) and from (26)
f = (c  f1 b1)=b2
In a pooling equilibrium type g is underpriced. Thus, we will look for a
pooling equilibrium which minimizes the mispricing of type g. The mispricing
is the di¤erence between the Employers rst-best return g1 + g2   2c and
its equilibrium payo¤ V f1g .
Proposition 3. Pooling with f1 = cb1 minimizes mispricing if and only
if g2
b2
 g1
b1
; pooling with f1 =
maxf0;c (1 c=maxf e2(0); e2(1)g) b2gb1 minimizes mis-
pricing if and only if g2
b2
< g1
b1
.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is that if g2=b2  g1=b1 the extent
of uncertainty regarding long-term cash ows is large. In this case optimal
contracts put as much weight as possible on the rst period (from (26) the
maximal value of f1 is c=b1) to reduce the "lemon" e¤ect of asymmetric
information and vice versa.
Finally note that, if an ine¢ cient separating equilibrium exists (one where
type b has its rst-best payo¤ in equilibrium while type g is undervalued
because it o¤ers a larger annual bonus (or larger fraction of stock) than in the
symmetric information case to avoid being mimicked by b) then mispricing
is larger than in a pooling equilibrium described in Proposition 3. Proof of
this is omitted for brevity but is available upon request.
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5 Implications.
(i) The present paper argues that asymmetric information regarding the tim-
ing of a rms performance prole over time may a¤ect the structure of
earnings-based compensation contracts for employees. In particular, it ex-
plains why it motivates rms to issue stock options for employees (versus
annual bonuses). From Proposition 1, a rms compensation policy is ir-
relevant when information is symmetric. It is relevant when information is
asymmetric as implied by Propositions 2 and 3.
Jensen andMeckling (1976) argue that earnings-based compensation links
an employees wealth with a rms value thus mitigating moral hazard and
agency problems. Since then numerous extensions of this theory have been
developed. However, we have not found one that is focused on explaining
the link between the structure of earnings-based compensation and the fu-
ture dynamics of earnings. Also note that Yermack (1995, 1997) analyzes
the determinants of top executives options grants and concludes that agency
theory does not explain observed data. Oyer and Schae¤er (2005) do not
nd any support for moral hazard explanations for why rms issue options
to employees. Another theory is based on employeesrisk-aversion. It argues
that options, by introducing convexity into their payo¤s, can improve other-
wise conservative decision-making by employees. However, this idea has been
challenged by Carpenter (2000) and Ross (2004), who argue that options can
actually increase managersaversion to risk. Among other approaches note:
inducing employees to sort, helping rms retain employees and tax consider-
ation. While all of them nd some empirical support, none is considered a
major idea behind the usage of stock options in theoretical literature.
(ii) The model predicts that short-term incentives will prevail if the extent
of asymmetric information in the rst period is lower than that in the second
period and vice versa. This is implied by Proposition 3. g2=b2 < g1=b1
means that the extent of uncertainty about future earnings is lower than that
in the rst period. Instead, if g2=b2 > g1=b1, stock options will prevail.
In addition to the evidence provided in the introduction, note that Hayes
and Schae¤er (2000) nd that incentive plans become relatively more reliant
on insidersprivate information about rms future performance when the
precision of current accounting information decreases.
(iii) It follows from Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 that if the extent of
asymmetric information regarding rmstotal values is small enough (com-
pared to the extent of asymmetric information regarding the performance
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prole over time) then a separating equilibrium may exist. This equilibrium
implies that rms which o¤er higher fractions of equity (through options)
in their compensation contracts have higher operating performance in the
short-run and lower operating performance in the long-run (as compared to
rms which o¤er fewer options). This is type b if g2 > b2 and g1 < b1 and
is type g if g2 < b2 and g1 > b1. Empirical literature produces di¤erent
evidence regarding the impact of compensation contracts on rms future
operating performance. However, the following papers are noteworthy. Yer-
mack (1997) shows that rms issuing stock options for employees outperform
other rms shortly after issue while there is no signicant di¤erence in the
long run. Cheng and Farber (2006) nd that among rms which experience
nancial restatement those which decrease the portion of stock options in
managerscompensation contracts perform better in the long term. It has
also been observed (Gilson and Vetsuypens, 1994) that rms in nancial
distress (with a projected decrease in cash ows) o¤er a higher fraction of
stock options in their compensation structure and a lower fraction of bonus
or cash-based compensation.
As an alternative explanation for why using options for employees may
lead to long-term underperformance, Gao and Shrieves (2002) argue that a
high proportion of options in compensation contracts provides an incentive
to engage in earnings manipulation by pumping earnings in periods when
their portfolios of options are large. Thus, less e¤ort will be allocated to
production activities. This argument only works if agents are not able to
rationally anticipate opportunistic behavior of this kind. In this case, man-
agers and employees can mislead the stock market by dressing earnings. We
share the idea that insiders can be involved in earnings management leading
to asymmetric information about the rms performance prole over time.
However, our explanation is based on completely rational agents.
Issuing more options to workers leads to an increase in equity capital.
Thus, our ndings are also consistent with the well-known phenomenon that
rms issuing equity underperform other rms in the long run and outperform
them in the short run (see, among others, Jain and Kini (1994) and Loughran
and Ritter (1997)).
While the empirical literature mentioned above provides some data which
is similar to the spirit of the present paper, a complete test of the results
must be based on incorporating the temporal distribution of informational
asymmetry into the empirical analysis of compensation contracts. The key
problem is to nd proxies for the distribution of informational asymmetry.
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One can use, for example, the degree to which a rm is established. Possible
proxies for this are the rms age and size. The younger and smaller the
rm, the more asymmetry one would expect regarding short-term cash ows.
Another proxy for the temporal distribution of informational asymmetry is
industry membership. Firms with large R&D expenditures and signicant
growth opportunities (Tobins Q can be used as a proxy for growth oppor-
tunities; it can be calculated, for instance, as book value of assets minus
book value of equity plus market value of equity divided by book value of as-
sets) can be seen as ones with low short-term asymmetry and high long-term
asymmetry. Firms in industries with high cyclicality in short-term demand,
such as consumer durables and housing, should exhibit relatively higher lev-
els of informational asymmetry regarding short-term prospects. Most data
indicated above are available from COMPUSTAT or Standard and Poors
database. Also, rms with strict reporting requirements should have rel-
atively less asymmetry regarding the short term because accounting data
has relatively more predictive power for short-run rather than long-run per-
formance (see, for example, Brown and Roze¤ (1979) and Bushman et al.
(2004)).9
For rms facing relatively more informational asymmetry in the long
term bonuses are a more likely form of compensation. Stock options are
most likely to be observed when the degree of informational asymmetry is
fairly large regarding the short-run and fairly small regarding distant cash
ows (one can gather data on employeescompensation from, for example,
Standard and Poors Execucomp, ProxyBase dataset of Hewitt associates or
Surveys conducted by the National Center for Employees Ownership). These
hypotheses can be empirically investigated using polychotomous dependent
variable technique such as multinominal logit/probit models (see, for exam-
ple, Kennedy (2003), Chapter 15). Further, the tightening of accounting
standards would tend, through the imposition of increased reporting, to de-
crease informational asymmetry regarding short-term cash ows, leading us
to predict that such changes would tend to increase corporate dependence
on annual bonuses.
9Also note that the conservative rms, i.e. rms that incorporate "bad" news into
accounting numbers more quickly than "good" news can be seen as ones with low short-
term asymmetry and high long-term asymmetry because, as shown by Basu (1997), "bad"
news has more of an e¤ect on short-term earnings while the e¤ect of "good" news is
generally more persistent over time. The degree of conservatism can be measured, for
instance, by the degree of legal liabilities of auditors.
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The result of Proposition 2 that rms using more stock options in their
compensation packages have lower long-term expected performance relative
to other rms can be tested using the techniques similar to those in Jain
and Kini (1994), Yermack (1997), Loughran and Ritter (1997) or Cheng and
Farber (2006). More challenging would be to test the conditions for the ex-
istence of a separating equilibrium, another result of this proposition. This
may indicate the conditions under which one would observe the previous
phenomenon (underperformance of rms issuing more stock options) more
frequently. As predicted by Proposition 2, this is the case when asymmetry
regarding the magnitude of rmsexpected earnings is relatively small, while
the asymmetry regarding the timing of earnings is relatively large. The ex-
tent of asymmetric information regarding the rmstotal values should be
inversely related to the market liquidity of rmsshares (see, for instance,
Bharath, Pasquariello, andWu (2006)). The latter can be measured using the
following proxies: the bid-ask spread, return-volume coe¢ cient and the prob-
ability of informed trading (Easley, Kiefer, OHara and Peperman (1996)).
The data can be taken form CRSP NYSE/AMEX database. One can use the
spread in the forecasts of future earnings (long-term spread versus short-term
spread) as a proxy for asymmetric information about the timing of earnings.
A lack of consensus among the analysts about the future earnings of the
followed rm suggests a lack of rm-specic information. This measure is
available from Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). I/B/E/S
provides (among others) forecasts dispersion for one-year ahead earnings but
also for the ve-year earnings. Also, as mentioned above, rms manipulating
earnings can be seen as ones with a high degree of asymmetric information
about the timing of earnings since earnings management can often be seen
as a redistribution of earnings between periods rather than accounting fraud
(Degeorge et al, 1999).
An interesting direction for future empirical research would be to gener-
alize the notion of temporal distribution of informational asymmetry with
the goal of constructing better proxies for the temporal distribution. Under
one scenario, the evolution of the variance of rm cash ows can act as a
proxy for the distribution of asymmetric information. This would be the
case when the average quality of inside information is the same for all rm
types across all dates. In this case, increased cash ow volatility over time,
which could be estimated using GARCH techniques or the term structure of
implied volatility estimated using option prices, would imply greater informa-
tion asymmetry regarding long-term cash ows. Conversely, decreasing cash
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ow variance over time would imply lower informational asymmetry regard-
ing long-term cash ows. In this fashion one could relate the term structure
of volatility to the structure of earnings-based compensation contracts.
6 Conclusion.
Lambert (2001) suggested that the private insider information may a¤ect
the structure of compensation contracts. This paper analyzes the structure
of earnings-based compensation contracts (annual bonuses versus stock op-
tions) when employers have private information about the rmsqualities and
workers are subject to moral hazard. The model predicts that short-term in-
centives will prevail if the extent of short-term asymmetric information is low
relative to long-term asymmetric information. It is also shown that among
rms with potentially high degrees of asymmetric information regarding the
timing of earnings (for instance, among rms involving in earnings manage-
ment) those o¤ering more stock options in compensation packages outperform
in the short-run and underperform in the long-run. A discussion of empirical
implications of these results is provided.
Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 1. Under symmetric information the rst-best solu-
tion can be obtained in the following manner. First, note that in equilibrium
(4) and e2 = 1 cannot hold simultaneously with c > f22. In this case,
V1 = 2 and from (6) the Workers payo¤ is (f + f2)2   c which is less
than f2. Thus, the Worker will sell their shares at the beginning of t = 2
and chose e2 = 0. Therefore, if the second-period constraint is satised in
equilibrium then c  f22. From (5) the rm is interested in minimizing f2
by making sure that (4) holds. If (4) does not hold then from (5) the rms
second-period payo¤ is 0. Therefore, f2 = c=2  fn. Together with c  f22
this implies fn = 0 and f2 = c=2. From (7) c = f11 + f2 and from (9)
V0 = E = 1 + 2   2c. End proof.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose the opposite is true and such an equilibrium
exists. Let g play the strategy f1g. It follows from (16), (17) and gt > bt
that V f1gbg = (1  f1g)b1 + (1  f2g   fg)b2 > b1 + b2   2c. End proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. First consider g2 > b2 and g1 < b1. Proof of
necessity. From (15), (16) and (17), the incentive constraint (13) for type g
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holds if and only if:
f1b  A (30)
where
A = 2c(g2   b2)=(b1g2   g1b2) (31)
The incentive constraint (14) for type b holds if and only if:
f1g  A (32)
This proves f1b  f1g. Now from (1) and (16) we have:
f1g  c=g1 (33)
From (32) and (33) c=g1  A. By (31) this can be rewritten as the condition
(19).
Su¢ ciency. Suppose that (19) holds and consider a situation with f1g =
c=g1 and f1b = 0. The incentive constraint for b holds because of (19) and
the above argument. The incentive constraint for g holds noting that A > 0.
Now consider g2 < b2 and g1 > b1. Necessity. From (15), the incentive
constraint (13) for type g holds if and only if:
f1b  A (34)
The incentive constraint (14) for type b holds if and only if:
f1g  A (35)
This proves f1b  f1g. From (2) and (17) we have:
fg  1  c=g2 (36)
Now from (1), (16) and (36):
f1g  (2c  g2)=g1 (37)
From (35) and (37)
(2c  g2)=g1  A
This can be rewritten as (18).
Su¢ ciency. Suppose that (18) holds and consider a situation with f1g =
(2c   g2)=g1 if 2c > g2 and f1g = 0 if 2c  g2 and f1b = c=b1. The
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incentive constraint for b holds because of (18). The incentive constraint for
g holds noting that c=b1 > A because
g1
b1
+ g2
b2
 2. End proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. Consider the case rg  rb. First we show that if a
separating equilibrium exists then rg  1. From Proposition 2, if a separating
equilibrium exists then (21) holds. Since the left side of (21) is increasing in
vg it should also be
(rg+rb)(1+rg)
rg(1+rb)
 2. This implies rg  1. Take the partial
derivatives of left of (21). We have: @(:)=@rb < 0; @(:)=@rg > 0; @(:)=@vb >
0; @(:)=@vg < 0. This implies that (21) holds if: 1) rb is su¢ ciently small
(other parameters being equal); 2) vb is su¢ ciently large; 3) rg is su¢ ciently
large and; 4) vg is su¢ ciently small. Now consider the case rb > rg. From
Proposition 2, if a separating equilibrium exists then (20) holds. The rest
follows from analyzing the partial derivatives of left side of (20). End proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. In equilibrium (22) cannot hold simultaneously with
c > f2(2g2 + (1   2)b2). In this case V1 = 2g2 + (1   2)b2 and from
(23) the Workers payo¤ is (f +f2)(2g2+(1 2)b2)  c which is less than
f(2g2+(1 2)b2). Thus, the Worker will sell their shares at the end of t =
1 and chose e2 = 0. Therefore, if the second-period constraint is satised in
equilibrium then c  f2(2g2+(1 2)b2). Now consider f2. Both types are
better o¤with f2 being as small as possible. To achieve this they must make
sure that (22) holds. If (22) does not hold then, from (5), the rms second-
period payo¤ is 0. Therefore, f2 = c=(2g2+(1 2)b2) fn. Together with
c  f2(2g2 + (1   2)b2) this implies fn = 0 and f2  f2(r1) = c=e2(r1);
where e2(r1) = 2g2+(1 2)b2. In contrast to the symmetric information
case, f2 depends on 2 and r1. From (24) c = f1 b1 + f b2. End proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. From (29) @V
f1
g
@f1
=  g1+ b1g2b2 . Thus, if g2b2  g1b1 ,
f1 should be maximized. From (26) it is f1 = cb1 . Otherwise f1 should be
minimized. A minimal f1 corresponds to a maximal f . From (2) and (27) f 
1  c=maxfe2(0); e2(1)g. This condition, together with (1) and (26), implies
f1  maxf0;c (1 c=maxf e2(0); e2(1)g) b2gb1 . To prove that these pooling equilibria
exist and that they satisfy the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion, rst note that
since a separating equilibrium minimizes mispricing compared to pooling
we only consider the cases when (18) and (19) do not hold. Also, a strategy
where at least one incentive constraint for the Worker is not satised is always
dominated, for all types of Employers, by a strategy where both incentive
constraints hold (given limited liability). It holds, whatever the Workers
beliefs are, when they observe such a strategy out o¤ equilibrium. Thus, no
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type of Employer will deviate to such a strategy. Therefore, we consider only
the o¤-equilibrium strategies for which both incentive constraints hold (for
some beliefs). For this set of strategies the o¤-equilibrium beliefs supporting
equilibrium are that when observing strategy joff the Worker believes that
the type is b. Thus, type b does not deviate from the equilibrium because
its equilibrium payo¤ exceeds its rst-best payo¤. Also, type g does not
deviate. To see this note that from (18), (19) and (29), @V f1g =@ > 0. The
o¤-equilibrium beliefs satisfy the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion because type
b has the potential to earn more than its equilibrium payo¤ if the beliefs are
that the type is g since @V f1b =@ > 0. End proof.
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